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Relations between Russia and the United States are characterised by an asymmetry against Russia, whose expectations vis-à-vis the US remain unmet. The dynamics of Russia’s policy towards the US in the last sixteen years has been one of cyclic fluctuations. The recurrent scheme starts with a normalisation and positive developments in mutual relations at the onset of each new US president’s term, and end with an escalation of tensions and a crisis at the end of each presidency. Russia is too weak to be recognised by the United States as an equal partner or opponent, but too strong to be willing or able to accept the status of an inequitable, tactical ally of the US. Moreover, Moscow has hardly anything to offer the US in a positive sense, apart from possibly limiting the negative impacts of its policies on Washington’s interests. Making predictions about Russian-American relations at this moment is very risky. In the most likely scenario, the traditional pattern will again be repeated with Donald Trump’s new administration. However, that does not mean that Russia will inevitably suffer a strategic defeat, as Moscow may take advantage of the further weakening of the United States and the West.
Governance --- Economic policy --- Government/Political systems --- International relations/trade --- Military policy --- Political behavior --- Comparative politics --- Geopolitics --- Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, --- Russia (Federation) --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- Foreign relations --- Foreign relations --- Politics and government
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The slackening pace of important economic reforms, as well as the stimulus measures taken in response to the 2008 crisis to boost investments, have all led to a huge build-up of debt and created imbalances in the Chinese economy, including in the financial markets and the industrial sector. The new generation of Chinese leadership has previously shown a strong ambition to overcome the status quo and resume reforms, setting out a new economic reform agenda in 2013. // Vested interests, which grew out of state owned enterprises and the bureaucracy, have been regarded as the main line of resistance to further reforms. President Xi Jinping has centralised the decision-making over economic reform by expanding the structures of the Communist Party of China. The new tools for implementing reform turned out to be marred by several defects, which contributed to further stagnation of key reforms. Moreover, the slowing down of China’s economic growth has sparked a debate among the country’s top decision makers on the ultimate shape of economic policy, and the pace of subsequent reforms.
National Economy --- Supranational / Global Economy --- Economic policy --- International relations/trade --- Developing nations --- Geopolitics --- Xi, Jinping. --- China --- Politics and government
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O ile w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku rosyjski Daleki Wschód nie stanowił ważnego regionu w polityce wewnętrznej władz centralnych Rosji, o tyle po dojściu do władzy Władimira Putina został na poziomie deklaratywnym uznany za strategiczny. Moskwa nie potrafiła jednak dotąd wygenerować rzeczywistych impulsów rozwojowych w regionie. Z jednej strony wynika to z problemów systemowych występujących w całej Rosji – brak spójnej koncepcji rozwoju gospodarczego, nieefektywne zarządzanie; z drugiej strony z barier stricte lokalnych – problemy kadrowe, zdecentralizowany system energetyczny, ograniczone zaangażowanie inwestorów zagranicznych. Nie istnieje obecnie ryzyko marginalizacji regionu na podobieństwo lat dziewięćdziesiątych. Wydaje się jednak, że polityczna reintegracja regionu z federalnym centrum (ściślejsza instytucjonalna kontrola ze strony Moskwy) oraz status stabilnego zaplecza surowcowego państw azjatyckich to obecnie maksimum możliwości rozwojowych rosyjskiego Dalekiego Wschodu.
Politics / Political Sciences --- Politics --- Economic policy --- International relations/trade --- Russian Far East (Russia) --- Politics and government --- Economic conditions
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Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO would significantly improve the level of security in the Baltic Sea region in the long-term by changing the politico-military imbalance that is currently in Russia’s favour. However, it is unlikely that Stockholm and Helsinki will change their non-alignment policy in the coming years. They will rather focus on enhancing politico-military co-operation with NATO. This has grown in importance to both countries in recent years in line with rising uncertainty in the region. The Swedish and Finnish wish for more substance in their military relations with NATO will however be met with increasing limitations as allied activity in the Baltic Sea region is focusing on collective defence and the two countries are not member states. // Despite the positive effect Sweden and Finland’s cooperation with NATO exerts on the region’s security, it also has negative implications. It does not eliminate the uncertainty about the scope of the two countries’ co-operation with the alliance in the case of a military conflict. It offers Stockholm an illusory sense of security, slowing down the pace of investments in defence; and for Helsinki it is rather an element of its deterrence policy towards Russia than a genuinely considered alternative.
Politics / Political Sciences --- Politics --- Governance --- Government/Political systems --- International relations/trade --- Security and defense --- Military policy --- Geopolitics --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- Membership. --- Sweden --- Finland --- Sweden --- Finland --- Military policy. --- Military policy. --- Politics and government --- Politics and government
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